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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Raymond Scott Peck (herein after Peck) appeals from the District Court's 
decision upon judicial review affirming the order of the Idaho Transportation Department 
(hereinafter lTD) which disqualified Peck's commercial driver's license endorsement. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
ITD agrees with the "Course of Proceedings" as described in the brief filed by the 
Appellant. 
II. 
FACTS OF THE FACTS 
On December 2,2009, Peck was arrested for Driving Under the Influence Bonner 
County, Idaho. R. p 14. Because the BAC results showed a violation of Idaho Code 
Section 18-8004 the officer issued Peck a notice of suspension of his driver's license and 
a temporary non-commercial driving permit. See Peck v. lTD, 153 Idaho 37, 278 P.3d 
439 (Idaho App 2012). Peck challenged the administrative license suspension (ALS) to 
the Idaho Court of Appeals. 1d. The Idaho Court of Appeals issued its decision 
upholding the administrative license suspension on April 30, 2012. ld. 
On December 15, 2009, the Department mailed Peck a Notice of Disqualification 
(Notice) because the Department's records show that Peck had failed an evidentiary test 
for driving under the influence. Clerk's Record, page 1. The Notice stated, in part, that 
the Department was "withdrawing your driving privileges to operate a commercial 
vehicle for 365 days ... " The Notice also invited Peck to request an administrative hearing 
to contest the action by the Department. ld. 
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On December 30, 2009, Peck, through his attorney requested a hearing on the 
CDL disqualification. R.,p.2. On March 1,2012 Peck also filed a Petition for Stay in Re: 
CDL Disqualification and proposed Order for a stay in the CDL disqualification .. 
The administrative hearing on the CDL disqualification was held May 15,2012 
before hearing officer Michael Howell. At the hearing, the petitioner testified that he was 
not advised of the consequences to his CDL if he took and failed a BAC test. See T., p. 
4-6. Peck argued that the CDL disqualification was not proper because the petitioner was 
not advised of the potential consequences to his CDL if he took and failed the BAC 
testing. Id., p. 6-16. On May 18, 2012 the hearing officer issued his decision, in which he 
upheld the CDL disqualification for one year. In his decision, the hearing officer 
correctly wrote and held, in part: 
III. 
Idaho Code Section 18-8002A provides for the penalties associated with the 
failure of a blood test but is not intended to be all inclusive of all consequences 
that may result from an arrest for driving under the influence or for the failure of a 
blood alcohol test. The Idaho Code and the regulations of the Department of 
Transportation contain other civil consequences for such action. 
VI. 
The disqualification of the driver's commercial driving privileges is a 
consequence unique to commercial drivers that resulted from his failure of the 
breath test and is in addition to any consequences contained in Idaho Code 
Section 18-8002A. 
VII 
The Administrative License Suspension proceedings as set forth in Idaho Code, 
Section 49-8002A 1 are separated and distinct from and not relevant to the 
disqualification of commercial driving privileges except the result form the basis 
ofthe disqualification in this matter. 
VIII 
The requirement of notice and the procedure set forth in Idaho Code Section 18-
8002A are not affected by or modified by Idaho Code, Section 49-335(2), and 
there is no additional notice requirement to the statutory notices set forth in 
I This is an obvious typographical error and should be cited as 18-8002A. 
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Section 18-8002A as a result of the additional consequences for commercial 
drivers in Section 49-335(2). 
IX. 
Idaho Code, Section 49-335 was modified by the state legislature to subject a 
commercial driver to a disqualification for any conviction of driving under the 
influence, whether driving a commercial vehicle or not, effective July 1, 2005. 
X. 
The modification of Idaho Code, Section 49-335 was effective prior to the 
driver's arrest for driving under the influence, giving him statutory notice of the 
additional possible consequence prior to his actions which resulted in his 
conviction and prior to this actual conviction. 
XI 
The driver argued that the disqualification of his commercial driving privileges 
pursuant to I.C. Section 49-335(1)(a) is unconstitutional. The very issue of the 
notice the driver claimed was lacking and a violation of his constitutional rights 
was specifically addressed by the Court of Appeals in Mr. Peck's appeal to the 
court. The court stated: 
Neither section 18-8002A nor due process requires an officer to inform a 
person subject to license suspension of the consequences regarding a 
separate disqualification under section 49-335(2). The notice of 
consequences contained in section 18-8002A (and reflected in the 
advisory form) is not deficient simply because it did not inform Peck of 
consequences under a different statute. See Buell v. Idaho Dep't of 
Transp., 151 Idaho 257, 264, 254 P.3d 1253, 1260 (Ct.App.2011) (holding 
a person with a CDL is presumed to have knowledge of the laws 
governing CDLs, and therefore, Buell " was presumed to know that the 
disqualification of his CDL was in addition to any suspensions he received 
under [Title 18]" ); Thompson v. State, 138 Idaho 512,516,65 P.3d 534, 
538 (Ct.App.2003) (rejecting an argument that the police officer was 
obligated to give a driver advice regarding all consequences of taking a 
breath test, not just those delineated in section 18-8002A). Therefore, 
Peck's due process rights were not violated. Peck v. State of Idaho, 
Department of Transportation, Court of Appeal 2012 Opinion No. 25, at p. 
6. 
R., p. 16-19. On June 5, 2012 Peck filed a Petition for Judicial Review. The appeal was 
heard by the Honorable Jeff Brudie. On February 4, 2013, Judge Brudie correctly upheld 
the action ofITD and affirmed the decision of the hearing officer. R. p. 117. 
III. CHARACTERIZATION OF THE ISSUES 
The issues on appeal are stated as follows: 
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1. Did the Notice of Suspension violate Peck's right to procedural due process 
because it did not inform Peck of the requirements of Idaho Code Section 49-
335(2)? 
2. Did the disqualification of a Commercial Driver's License violate Peck's right 
to substantive due process because he was not operating a commercial vehicle 
at the time of his arrest? 
3. Is Peck entitled to attorney fees on appeal? 
IV. 
ARGUMENT 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW ON THE PETITION FOR REVIEW 
In this appeal the burden of proof is on Peck. In order to vacate or remand the 
decision of the hearing officer, Peck must establish that the decision of the hearing officer 
was: (a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) in excess of the statutory 
authority of the agency; (c) made upon unlawful procedure; (d) not supported by 
substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or (e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of 
discretion. 
Generally, in a Petition for Judicial Review, the court reviews the agency's 
underlying decision. The scope of review is such that "[t]he court shall not substitute its 
judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact." 
Idaho Code Section 67-5279. The scope of review is such that this Court must uphold the 
hearing officer's conclusions of law unless those conclusions of law fall within the 
enumerated violations set forth in Idaho Code Section 67-5379 (3) (a-e). 
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The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (IDAP A) governs the review of 
department decisions to deny, cancel, suspend, disqualify, revoke or restrict a person's 
driver's license. See I.C. §§ 49-201,49-330,67-5201(2),67-5270 and In re Suspension of 
Driver's License ofGibbar, 143 Idaho 937, 155 P.3d 1176 (Ct. App. 2006). In an appeal 
from the decision ofthe district court acting in its appellate capacity under IDAPA, this 
Court reviews the agency record independently of the district court's decision. Marshall 
v. Idaho Dep't ofTransp., 137 Idaho 337, 340, 48 P.3d 666,669 (Ct.App.2002). This 
Court does not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the 
evidence presented. I.C. § 67-5279(1); Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669. This 
Court instead defers to the agency's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. 
Castaneda v. Brighton Corp., 130 Idaho 923, 926, 950 P.2d 1262, 1265 (1998); 
Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669. In other words, the agency's factual 
determinations are binding on the reviewing court, even where there is conflicting 
evidence before the agency, so long as the determinations are supported by substantial 
competent evidence in the record. Urrutia v. Blaine County, ex reI. Bd. of Comm 's, 134 
Idaho 353, 357, 2 P.3d 738, 742 (2000); Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669. 
A court may overturn an agency's decision where its findings, inferences, 
conclusions, or decisions: (a) violate statutory or constitutional provisions; (b) exceed the 
agency's statutory authority; (c) are made upon unlawful procedure; (d) are not supported 
by substantial evidence in the record; or (e) are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of 
discretion. I.e. § 67-5279(3). The party challenging the agency decision must 
demonstrate that the agency erred in a manner specified in I.C. § 67-5279(3) and that a 
substantial right of that party has been prejudiced. Price v. Payette County Bd. of County 
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Comm'rs, 131 Idaho 426,429,958 P.2d 583,586 (1998). lfthe agency's decision is not 
affirmed on appeal, "it shall be set aside ... and remanded for further proceedings as 
necessary." I.e. § 67-5279(3). 
B. IDAHO LAW AND FEDERAL LAW 
Generally, Idaho Code § 18-8002A prescribes the penalties governing all aspects 
of a motorist's driving privileges in the event that the motorist submits to, but fails, 
evidentiary testing. I.C. § 18-8002A(4)(a). The suspension is imposed by ITD and the 
statute provides for administrative review of the suspension. I.C. § 18-8002A(4), (7). 
This is commonly referred to as an Administrative License Suspension (ALS). 
Idaho's motor vehicle code prescribes additional consequences which result from 
a motorist's refusal to submit to evidentiary testing or failing such testing. On July 1, 
2007 Idaho Code Section 49-335 was modified to subject a driver with a CDL to 
disqualification if the driver fails a test for alcohol whether the person is operating a 
commercial vehicle or not. These additional consequences solely relate to the ability to 
operate commercial vehicles pursuant to Idaho Code § 49-335(2). This is commonly 
known as a CDL disqualification. 
The disqualification of Peck's CDL was pursuant to Idaho Code § 49-335. Idaho 
Code § 49-335 provides in pertinent part as follows: 
(1) Any person who operates a commercial motor vehicle or who holds a class A, 
B or C driver's license is disqualified from operating a commercial motor vehicle 
for a period of not less than one (1) year if convicted in the form of a judgment or 
withheld judgment of a first violation under any state or federal law of: 
(a) Operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or a controlled 
substance; 
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* * * 
(2) Any person who operates a commercial motor vehicle or who holds a class A, 
B or C driver's license is disqualified from operating a commercial motor vehicle 
for a period of not less than one (1) year if the person refuses to submit to or 
submits to and fails a test to determine the driver's alcohol, drug or other 
intoxicating substances concentration while operating a motor vehicle. 
* * * 
(4) A person is disqualified for the period of time specified in 49 CFR part 383 if 
found to have committed two (2) or more of any of the offenses specified in 
subsection (1) or (2) ofthis section, or any combination of those offenses, arising 
from two (2) or more separate incidents. [emphasis added]. 
In 1999, Congress passed the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act, 
which included provisions requiring that the holder of a CDL be prohibited from driving 
a commercial motor vehicle if he or she has been convicted of certain violations of a 
state's motor vehicle laws. 49 C.F.R. § 383.51 identifies the offenses that "disqualify" the 
holder of a CDL from driving a commercial motor vehicle. A state that fails to comply 
with this federal mandate risks losing federal highway funds. Pursuant to 49 CFR 383.51 
of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration a first incident required that the 
holder of CDL must be disqualified from operating a commercial motor vehicle for one 
year. A copy of 49 CRF 383.51 is attached as Exhibit 1. Therefore, the disqualification 
of Peck's CDL is required by both Idaho State Law and Federal Regulation. 
C. SUSTANTIVE AND PROCEDUREAL DUE PROCESS 
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Peck argues that his right to procedure and/or substantive due process was 
violated by the CDL disqualification at issue in this matter.2 Petitioner's argument is 
without legal or factual basis. 
In the prior ALS appeal, Peck argued that due process was violated due to defects 
in the notice given to Peck prior to the evidentiary testing. Peck v. lTD, 153 Idaho 37, 
278 P.3d 439 eCt. App. 2012) footnote 2. In that case, the Court of Appeals explained the 
difference between substantive due process and procedural due process. Id. Substantive 
due process means that the reason for depriving the driver's license cannot be arbitrary. 
Id. A challenge to the license suspension procedure and advisory is a procedural due 
process claim. Id. 
1. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: 
THE PROCEDURE AND THE ADVISORY ARE LAWFUL 
Peck argued that the advisory given to him failed to adequately advise him of all 
his rights, and it therefore constitutionally defective. As discussed below, this argument 
lacks merit. 
Issues regarding the constitutionality of a CDL disqualification were brought to 
the Idaho Court of Appeals recently in Buell v. Idaho Department o/Transportation, 151 
Idaho 257 eCt. App. 2011). Buell first argued that the CDL disqualification violated the 
principles of double jeopardy. This argument was rejected by the Court of Appeals. 
Buell then argued that his due process rights were violated because I.e. §§ 18-8002, 
18-8002A, and 49-335 are ambiguous and did not adequately notify him of when his 
2 Peck does not distinguish whether he argues a violation of the Due Process Clause of the United States 
Constitution or Idaho Constitution; however, the due process guarantees in each are substantially the same. 
See Peck v lTD, 153 Idaho 37, 278 P.3d 439 (Ct. App. 2012) at footnote 2. 
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CDL disqualification would begin. The Court of Appeals also rejected this argument, 
stating: 
Idaho Code Sections 18-8002 and 18-8002A are part of the criminal code. Idaho 
Code Section 18-8002 provides for suspension of a noncommercial driver's 
license when a driver has refused to submit to an evidentiary BAC test. Idaho 
Code Section 18-8002A provides for the suspension of a driver's license when a 
driver has failed an evidentiary BAC test. The motor vehicle code prescribes 
additional consequences that result from a motorist's refusal to submit to 
evidentiary testing or for failing such testing. I.C. § 49-335. Idaho Code Section 
49-335(1)(a) provides that a CDL holder will be disqualified from operating a 
commercial vehicle for one year if convicted of driving under the influence. Idaho 
Code Section 49-335(2) provides that a CDL holder will be disqualified from 
operating a commercial vehicle for one year if the person refuses to submit to or 
fails a BAC evidentiary test. A disqualification under I.C. § 49-335 is in addition 
to a suspension under I.e. §§ 18-8002 or 18-8002A and relates solely to the 
driver's CDL. A holder of a CDL is presumed to have knowledge of the laws 
governing CDLs. See Wilson v. State, 133 Idaho 874, 880, 993 P.2d 1205, 1211 
(Ct.App.2000). Therefore, Buell was presumed to know that the disqualification 
of his CDL was in addition to any suspensions he received under either I.C. §§ 
18-8002 or 18-8002A. 
Id. Likewise, in this case, CDL drivers, like the petitioner, are presumed to know that the 
disqualification of his CDL was an additional penalty to him for failing a BAC test. 
Additional issues regarding the constitutionality of Idaho CDL disqualification 
were brought before the Idaho Court Appeals in Williams v. Idaho Department of 
Transportation, 151 Idaho 257, 254 P.3d 1253 (CL App. 2012). In Williams, the 
petitioner was contesting a hearing officer's decision to disqualify Williams for life from 
holding a CDL because of a second conviction for driving under the influence. Williams 
raised several constitutional arguments against the action by lTD. Williams argued that 
his due process rights were violated because he was not notified that his CDL would be 
suspended if took and failed the BAC test. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument. 
The Court first outlined the burden of proof and stated: 
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Where the constitutionality of a statute is challenged, we review the lower court's 
determination de novo. State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 711, 69 P.3d 126,131 
(2003); State v. Martin, 148 Idaho 31, 34 218 P.3d 10,13 (Ct. App. 2009). The 
party attacking a statute on constitutional grounds must overcome a strong 
presumption of validity. Korsen, 138 Idaho at 711,69 P.3d at 131; Martin, 148 
Idaho at 34,218 P.3d at 13. Appellate courts are obligated to seek an 
interpretation of a statute that upholds its constitutionality. Korsen, 138 Idaho at 
711,69 P.3d at 131; Martin, 148 Idaho at 34,218 P.3d at 13. 
The Court of Appeals continued, addressing the petitioner's argument: 
A statute may be challenged as unconstitutionally vague on its face or as applied 
to a complainant'S conduct. Korsen, 138 Idaho at 712,69 P.3d at 132; Martin, 148 
Idaho at 35,218 P.3d at 14. Here, Williams does not make a facial challenge, but 
contends only that the statute is impermissibly vague as applied to him. To 
succeed on an "as applied" vagueness challenge, a complainant must show that 
the statute failed to provide fair notice that the complainant's specific conduct was 
prohibited or failed to provide sufficient guidelines such that police had unbridled 
discretion in determining whether to charge the complainant. Martin, 148 Idaho at 
35,218 P.3d at 14. 
Williams argues that he was not adequately notified of the consequences of 
submitting to the tests as required by I.C. § 18-8002. In denying Williams' claim 
that the statute was void for vagueness, the district court stated: 
This issue was recently addressed, in part, by the Idaho Supreme Court in 
Wanner v. lTD, 150 Idaho 164,244 P.3d 1250 (2011), wherein the Idaho 
Supreme Court held that a § 18-8002A suspension governs driving 
privileges in toto, while an I.C. § 49-335 suspension applies to a particular 
subset of driving privileges, i.e. the right to operate a commercial vehicle. 
Further the Idaho Court of Appeals addressed a similar argument in Buell, 
supra. There, Buell argued that his due process rights were violated 
because I.C. §§ 18-8002, 18-8002A, and 49-335 are ambiguous and did 
not adequately notify him of when his CDL disqualification would begin. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals held that I.C. §§ 18-8002 and 18-8002A are 
criminal statutes and address suspension of non-commercial licenses. 
Further, I.C. § 49-335 prescribes additional consequences that result from 
a motorist's refusal to take or the failure of an evidentiary test. The Buell 
court held that a disqualification under I.C. § 49-335 is in addition to a 
suspension under I. C. § § 8002 and 8002A. 
A holder of a CDL is presumed to have knowledge of the laws governing 
CDLs. Wilson v. State, 133 Idaho 874, 880, 993 P.2d 1205, 1211 (Ct. App. 
2000). Williams argues that at no time was he informed that his CDL 
would be suspended for his lifetime if he failed the breath testing. The 
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record shows that Williams was provided the required notifications as 
required by 1. e. § 18-8002A. 
Williams was presumed to know that the disqualification of his CDL was 
in addition to any suspensions he received under I.e. §§ 18-8002 or 18-
8002A. Williams was also presumed to know the consequences ifhe was 
convicted of any of the offenses listed in I.C. § 49-335(1) or refused to 
submit to or failed an evidentiary test pursuant to I.C. § 49-335(2). He was 
also presumed to know that his CDL would be suspended for life for two 
or more major events as specified in I.C. § 49-335(1) or (2). 
This Court finds that I.C. §§ 18-8002, 18-8002A and 49-335 are not void 
for vagueness. There is no legal requirement that an arresting officer 
provide notice of all the collateral effects that a breath test failure will 
have on one's CDL endorsement. As a holder of a CDL, Williams was 
presumed to have such knowledge. 
In this case, there was no violation of Peck's right to procedural due process. 
Peck argues that the Notice of Suspension was not adequate because it failed to inform 
him of the provisions and consequences ofIdaho Code § 49-335(2). Peck does not argue 
that he did not receive the admonitions required by Idaho Code §§ 18-8002 and 18-
8002A. Instead, he invites this Court to add language to those code sections by including 
other consequences to the Suspension Advisory form. This Court should decline the 
invitation. Idaho law does not require that a driver be informed of every single 
consequence of the failure of an evidentiary test. Specifically, Idaho Code §§ 18-8002 and 
18-8002A do not require law enforcement officers to inform drivers of every potential 
consequence of failing the evidentiary test. In fact, in Peck v. lTD, the Idaho Court of 
Appeals held: 
In regards to whether Peck was afforded procedural due process relating to his 
license suspension by the notice actually given, Peck does not argue the notice of 
suspension advisory form was ambiguous or did not completely advise him of his 
rights and duties under section 18-8002A. In fact, the advisory form specifically 
provided all information required by section 18-8002A and gave him notice of the 
license suspension and the procedures afforded to him to challenge it. Neither 
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section 18-8002A nor due process requires an officer to inform a person subject to 
license suspension of the consequences regarding a separate disqualification 
under section 49-335(2). The notice of consequences contained in section 18-
8002A (and reflected in the advisory form) is not deficient simply because it did 
not inform Peck of consequences under a different statute. See Buell v. Idaho 
Dep't of Transp., 151 Idaho 257, 264, 254 P.3d 1253, 1260 (Ct.App.2011) 
(holding a person with a CDL is presumed to have knowledge of the laws 
governing CDLs, and therefore, Buell " was presumed to know that the 
disqualification of his CDL was in addition to any suspensions he received under 
[Title 18]" ); Thompson v. State, 138 Idaho 512, 516, 65 P.3d 534, 538 
(Ct.App.2003) (rejecting an argument that the police officer was obligated to give 
a driver advice regarding all consequences of taking a breath test, not just those 
delineated in section 18-8002A). Therefore, Peck's due process rights were not 
violated. 
Id, page 445. 
In its decision, the District Court also cited a case from the state of Wyoming, 
noting the similarities of the DUI laws. In Escarcega v. Wyoming Department of 
Transportation, 153 P.3d 264 (Wyo 2007) stated: 
It would be impractical to require that an arresting officer convey all the 
information in both statutory schemes to an arrestee before requesting a specimen 
for chemical testing. The implied consent and various driver's license statutes 
contain multiple interrelated provisions for penalties that may be heightened or 
vary according to the circumstances of each violation. To require a detailed 
recitation of all statutory penalties involved in a traffic stop would be a misuse of 
law enforcement resources and would not serve the purpose of the implied 
consent statutes. The implied consent law was intended as a complement to the 
DWUI statute and was designed to facilitate tests for intoxication, not to inhibit 
the ability of the state to keep drunk drivers off the road. Chastain, 594 P.2d at 
461. 
Implied consent is, by nature, implied in law. Merely by choosing to drive 
a motor vehicle on the roads of this state, a driver agrees to submit to chemical 
testing in the event of his arrest for DWUI. The consequences for refusing a 
chemical test are published law, of which every citizen is presumed to have 
knowledge. See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199, 111 S.Ct. 604, 609, 
112 L.Ed.2d 617 (1991). The Legislature has created a few limited exceptions to 
that rule by requiring that specific warnings be given to drivers in certain 
situations before penalties can be imposed. Appellant here was given the precise 
warning required by the applicable statutes for a driver stopped in a non-
commercial vehicle. He was entitled to no more and no less 
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Id., at page 270. In the Peck Decision, the District Court then explained: 
The DUI statutory scheme enacted by Idaho's legislature, like that of 
Wyoming's, contains "multiple interrelated provision for penalties that may be 
heightened or way according to the circumstances of each violation." Idaho Code 
Section 49-335, which provides for disqualification and penalties relative to 
commercial driver's licenses, is referenced with I.C. § 18-8005 of Idaho's DUI 
scheme. However, the legislature chose not to reference I.C. § 49-335 within the 
mandatory notice provision provided in I.C. § 18-8002A(2). Idaho legislature set 
forth in I.C. § 18-8002A(2) the specific consequences a driver must e informed 
about prior to a law enforcement officer's request that a driver perform 
evidentiary testing subject to a DUI arrest. While the notification may not cover 
all potential consequences of refusing to submit to evidentiary testing or of failing 
evidentiary testing, it is all that Idaho's legislature has required, no more and no 
less. 
R., p.123. 
Peck also argued "implied consent" and that "implied consent required notice of 
one' rights and the consequences". Petitioner's brief page 8. This is a misstatement of 
the doctrine of "implied consent." The concept of implied consent in Idaho is explained 
in State v. Cooper, 136 Idaho 697 (Ct.App. 2001), where the court stated: 
Consent is a well-recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant 
requirement. State v. Rodriguez, 128 Idaho 521, 523, 915 P.2d 1379, 1381 
(Ct.App.1996). Idaho's driver licensing scheme provides, as a condition of 
possessing a valid license, that a driver of a motor vehicle is deemed to have 
consented to an evidentiary test for blood alcohol concentration where there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that the person has been driving or in actual 
physical control of a motor vehicle in violation of the DUI laws. Idaho Code § 18-
8002(1); McNeely v. State, 119 Idaho 182, 187,804 P.2d 911, 916 
(Ct.App.1990); see also South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 559, 103 S.Ct. 
916,920, 74 L.Ed.2d 748,755-56 (1983). 
Id., page 699. 
In support of his arguments, Peck cited in Matter a/Virgil, 126 Idaho 946, 947, 
895 P.2d 183 (Ct. App. 1995. That case is distinguishable to the facts and law of this 
case. In the Virgil case, the defendant successfully argued that an administrative license 
suspension imposed by a magistrate pursuant to Idaho Code Section 18-8002 must be set 
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aside because the Twin Falls Police Department's advisory form was defective and did 
not comply with the statutory language ofIdaho Code Section 18-8002(3).3 
Here, the Court of Appeals has already held that the Advisory Notice given to 
Peck at the time of his arrest "specifically provided him notice of the license suspension 
and the procedures afforded to him to challenge it." Therefore, unlike the Virgil case, the 
Notice given to Peck was not defective. 
Although a one year suspension of a CDL is another consequence of both the 
refusal to submit to the testing and the failure of the testing, it is not a potential 
consequence of which a driver must be informed at the time of his arrest. Therefore, the 
failure to inform Peck of the consequences to his CDL is not necessary and the Notice of 
Suspension given to Peck complied with Idaho law. 
2. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS: 
CDL DISQUALIFICATION IS NOT ARBITRARY 
Peck also argues that his substantive due process rights were violated because the 
CDL disqualification was arbitrary in that "the underlying conduct has no relation to the 
disqualified conduct of operating a commercial motor vehicle." This argument is also 
without merit. 
In Williams v. lTD, 151 Idaho 257, 254 P.3d 1253 (Ct. App. 2012), th15e Court of 
Appeals addressed a similar argument. In Williams, the petitioner argued that the CDL 
disqualification violated principles of Double Jeopardy. In addressing this argument, the 
Court dealt with the question as to whether the disqualification was excessive. The Court 
stated the following: 
3 Idaho Code Section 18-8002(3) has been amended since the Virgil case. The Notice provisions are now 
contained 18-8002A. 
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Sixth, we must consider whether there is a purpose, other than punishment, that 
could be assigned to the lifetime CDL disqualification and whether the 
disqualification is excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned to it. 
As noted above, the purpose ofLC. § 49-335 is to remove problem drivers from 
the road through disqualification. Statement of Purpose, SB 1001 (1989). The 
right of a citizen to operate a motor vehicle is substantial, but it is also subject to 
reasonable regulation by the State in the exercise of its police powers. Talavera, 
127 Idaho at 705,905 P.2d at 638. When a person is approved for a CDL, he or 
she agrees to abide by certain conditions and regulations. Id. The commercial 
driving industry is highly regulated because of the size and weight of commercial 
vehicles and the heightened danger they pose to the public should they be 
misused. Impaired commercial drivers pose a unique danger to the public because 
of the type of vehicles they operate. Therefore, disqualification of a CDL 
indicates only that the holder has failed to comply with the agreed conditions, not 
that he or she is being punished for a particular act. Id. 
The Williams Court went on to hold that "the lifetime disqualification from 
driving a commercial vehicle is not disproportionate to the statute's legitimate remedial 
goal of keeping problem drivers with multiple alcohol violations off the roadways." 
The holding in Williams is consistent the Court of Appeal holding in Buell where 
the Court held a one-year disqualification from driving a commercial vehicle was not 
disproportionate to the statute's legitimate remedial goal of keeping problem drivers off 
the roadways. Buell, page 1260. 
The District Court reviewed this issue and correctly found that: 
Peck failed to demonstrate that I.C. Section 49-335 is arbitrary or that it 
bear no rational relationship to any legitimate legislative objective. Therefore, 
Petitioner's assertion that his substantive due process rights were violated is 
without merit. 
Clerk's Record, page 124. 
In this case, there was no violation of Peck's right to substantive due process 
because the action by ITD is not arbitrary. Because of the size and weight of vehicles 
operated by a CDL driver, the industry is highly regulated. As the Idaho Court of 
Appeals has held, persons who hold a CDL endorsement agree to abide by certain 
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conditions and regulations to obtain and keep the endorsement. The additional regulation 
on CDL drivers is directly related to the unique danger to the public because of the types 
of vehicles they operate. Thus, CDL drivers are also subject to reasonable regulation by 
the State including a one year disqualification for an alcohol violation in a non-
commercial vehicle. 
V. 
NO ATTORNEY FEES 
Peck has also requested an award of attorney fees on this appeal. This argument 
is also without merit. To award attorney fees, the Court must rule in favor of Peck and 
also find that the Department acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. See, 
CanallNorcrestlColumbus Action Comm. v. City of Boise, 136 Idaho 666, 671, 39 P.3d 
606, 611 (2001). In this matter, as discussed above, there was a reasonable basis in law 
and in the facts upon which the hearing officer made his decision. Therefore, since 




ITD respectfully requests that the court uphold the decision of the District Court 
and of the hearing officer which sustained CDL disqualification. ITD also requested the 
court remand the matter to the District Court to vacate the stay of the CDL 
disqualification. 
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